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INTRODUCTION

The law of secured transactions in Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code has been adopted by the legislatures in virtually
every jurisdiction.' These statutory enactments basically retain the
language and form of Article 9 as written by the original drafters.
However, the uniform law adopted by the legislatures has not received corresponding uniform legal application in the judicial system. Judicial interpretation of commercial transactions involving a
security interest created by written agreement illustrates that uniform statutory law does not necessarily create uniform judicial
results.
Article 9 applies to transactions which are intended to create a
security interest.2 The Code provides two basic means of evidencing an intent that a security interest be created.3 A creditor may
retain possession of the collateral by mutual agreement as security
for the debt. Alternatively, the creditor and debtor may execute a
written security agreement which establishes the security interest.
The more frequently used device is the written security agree1. Foreward to 1978 Official Text and Comments, UNIFORM
CODE OFFICIAL TEXT-1978 at XLI (9th ed. 1978).
2. U.C.C. § 9-102 (1978).
3. Id. § 9-203.
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ment.4 A security agreement is an integral part of the Code law
governing the creation of a security interest in modern commercial
transactions.
Close scrutiny of what constitutes a security agreement under
the Uniform Commercial Code is warranted by divergent judicial
response to this question. Two broad classifications arise in this
area. First, the conservative judicial view narrowly interprets
U.C.C. section 9-203 to require a single document to satisfy the
requisites for a security agreement. The liberal view broadly interprets section 9-203 to allow the combination of several documents
to meet the requirements for a security agreement.
To effectuate the Code policies of simplicity, modernization,
clarity, certainty, and uniformity in commercial transactions concerning security agreements, the Code should be strictly construed
to require a single document to satisfy the minimal requirements
imposed by the Code. Liberal judicial interpretation of what constitutes a security agreement does not further the policies enunciated by the drafters of the Code. Comparative analysis of the liberal approach adopted by North Carolina and other jurisdictions
with the single document approach contemplated by the Code
reveals strict adherence to Code requirements is the better commercial policy. Upon analysis of the merits of these respective
views, this comment will recommend the conservative approach as
the better means of determining secured status.
Due to the narrow focus of this inquiry, the areas relating to
security agreements not covered by this comment are substantial.
Secured transactions law prior to the Uniform Commercial Code is
beyond the scope of this comment. It is generally acknowledged
that the Code is a vast improvement over the formalistic, complicated law in this area prior to the Code. Sufficiency of collateral
descriptions in the security agreement, creation of a security interest by possession, what constitutes a sufficient signature, whether
value is given for the security interest, and whether the debtor has
legal rights in the collateral will not be examined in this comment.
Developments in the law following enactment of the Code will be
analyzed in the statutory and judicial developments sections of the
comment.

C.

4. A. SQUILLANTE, The Security Agreement, 86 COM. L.J., 99, 101 (1978).
5. A. SQUILLANTE, supra note 4, at 138.
6. For a further discussion of these matters see 8 W. HAWKLAND, R. LORD, &
LEWIS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES §§ 9-101 to 9-402, (Art. 9, 1986).
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The purpose of this comment is to explore judicial interpretation of what constitutes a security agreement, to delineate the arguments available to an attorney confronted with a deficient security agreement and to advocate a return to the conservative single
document approach. Attorneys should also recognize that continued reliance on formal security agreements is advisable.

II.

STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS AND SECTION

9-203

Since the original Uniform Commercial Code was promulgated
in 1951 and first enacted by Pennsylvania in 1953, the Code has
been adopted in its entirety by virtually every state. 7 The first official text with comments was issued in 1962.8 Further revisions
were made in the Code to reflect changes in commercial practices
and commercial policies. 9 North Carolina formally adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code in 1965.10 Generally, North Carolina
has made corresponding revisions to Chapter 25 of the North Carolina General Statutes as changes occurred in the official text.
This comment will focus on section 9-203, which establishes
formal requisites for the creation of a security interest." "Security
interest" is defined in the Code,' 2 but may be characterized as the
7. General Comment, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE OFFICIAL TEXT-1978 at
xv (9th ed. 1978).
8. Id.
9. Revisions were made in 1962, 1968, 1972, and 1978.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-101 (1965).

11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-203 is identical to U.C.C. § 9-203 and is representative of most state enacted statutes. Section 25-9-203(1) and (2) states:
(1) Subject to the provisions of G.S. 25-4-208 on the security interest
of a collecting bank and G.S. 25-9-113 on a security interest arising
under the article on sales, a security interest is not enforceable against
the debtor or third parties with respect to the collateral and does not
attach unless (a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party
pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a security agreement
which contains a description of the collateral and in addition, when the
security interest covers crops growing or to be grown or timber to be cut,
a description of the land concerned; and (b) value has been given; and (c)
the debtor has rights in the collateral.
(2) A security interest attaches when it becomes enforceable against
the debtor with respect to the collateral. Attachment occurs as soon as
all of the events specified in subsection (1) have taken place unless explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching.
N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 25-9-203 (Cum. Supp. 1985).

12. "Security interest means an interest in personal property or fixtures
which secures payment or performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(37)
(1978).
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property right which results from the parties' agreements.' 3 Creation of a security interest is accomplished by the agreement itself,
but the interest does not apply to specific collateral until "attachment" occurs. Under the Code terminology, a security interest attaches when three prerequisites are satisfied. First, possession of
the collateral must be retained by the secured party pursuant to
agreement or there must be a written security agreement containing a description of the collateral and signed by the debtor. Second, value must be given by the secured party. Third, the debtor
must have rights in the collateral. 4 When these requirements are
5
fulfilled a security interest attaches automatically.
The agreement of the parties to create a security interest is
most often evidenced by a written security agreement. Agreement
is defined by the Code as "the bargain of the parties in fact."'"
Therefore, a security agreement is the bargain of the parties in fact
which creates or provides for a security interest. 17 In less definitional terms, the security agreement is a writing which sets out the
terms of the agreement and establishes the secured party's right to
the collateral. The minimal requirements for a valid security agreement are met by the debtor's signature, a description of the collateral, and language creating or providing for a security interest in a
writing.18
The security agreement provides an evidentiary function and
serves as a statute of frauds for the parties' agreement. 9 Once a
valid security agreement is created and the security interest attaches, the creditor is deemed to be secured. The creditor's security interest is generally enforceable against the debtor and against
third parties. 20 Absent a sufficient writing or possession of the collateral pursuant to agreement, the secured party's interest in the
collateral is not enforceable, even against the debtor. 2' The eviden13. A. SQUILLANTE, supra note 4, at 99.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-203(2).
15. A security interest does not arise automatically when there is explicit
agreement to postpone the time of -attaching. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-203(2).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-201(3) (1965).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-105(1)(1) (Cum.Supp. 1985).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-203(1). The language requirement is discussed infra, notes 40-69 and accompanying text.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-203 comments 3-5.

20. N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 25-9-203(1).

21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-203 comment 5. However, even though the debt is
not secured by specific property, the debt still exists and is payable from the
debtor's general assets.
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tiary purpose is fulfilled when a writing specifies the terms of the
agreement and describes the collateral.2 2
In the normal course of commercial transactions, the Code
contemplates a written security agreement, attachment of the security interest, and perfection of the security interest to determine
priority of claims. Perfection is a status whereby the secured
party's rights cannot be defeated by subsequent interests. 23 One
objective of perfection is to protect the security interest from insolvency of the debtor. Generally, to perfect a security interest, a financing statement must be filed.2 Requisites for a financing statement are the signature of the debtor, addresses of the debtor and
secured party, and a description of the collateral.2 5 Perfection occurs when the security interest is filed and has attached."6 The
purpose of filing a financing statement is to give notice to third
parties that a security interest is or may be claimed in the collateral. The basic difference between requirements for a security
agreement and a financing statement is that the Code does not require language creating or providing for a security interest in a financing statement.
The Code provisions concerning financing statements are essential to understanding what constitutes a security agreement
under the liberal and conservative views. Section 9-402 states that
a filed security agreement is sufficient as a financing statement if it
complies with the requirements of this Code section.2 7 Yet, no
court has held a financing statement, standing alone, sufficient to
constitute a security agreement.2 8 The arguments for both the conservative and liberal approaches to security agreements utilize this
distinction. The liberal position argues the apparent equivalency of
a security agreement and financing statement, while the conservative position notes their functional differences.
This section of the comment has attempted a basic outline of
the law applicable to security agreements to provide a framework
22. Id. comment 3.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-302 and comment 1. Other priorities are set out in
§§ 25-9-312 to 25-9-315.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-302 and comment 1.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-402.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-303(1).
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-402(1).

28.

J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

23-3 at 906 (2d ed.

1980); Mitchell v. Shepherd Mall State Bank, 458 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1972).
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for understanding the arguments for the liberal and conservative
views. The statutory law in all states is virtually identical, so what
constitutes a security agreement for a particular jurisdiction is
largely a result of judicial developments.
III.

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS

Judicial developments in interpreting section 9-203 are divisible into two approaches as to what documents satisfy the Code requirements for a security agreement. The conservative single document approach emphasizes that section 9-203's requirements must
be contained in a single writing to constitute a valid security agreement. 29 A liberal composite documents approach effectuates the
parties' intent by allowing documents to be combined to satisfy the
requirements of section 9-203.1 ° The trend in recent cases clearly
favors the composite documents approach."
The initial point of divergence for the two approaches is a consequence of the Code language. The Code language contemplates a
single document as the security agreement representing the parties' bargain in fact.32 However, section 1-102 mandates that the
Code provisions be liberally construed.33 Comment 1 to section 1102 indicates that a narrow or broad view may be utilized in applying the Code language to particular circumstances.3 4 A narrow, literal construction of the language supports the single document
view. The language, broadly construed, supports the view that relevant documents may be used in combination. While interpretation
of the Code language does initially separate these positions, the
29. American Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963).
30. See In re Bollinger, 614 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980); In re Amex-Protein
Development Corp. 504 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1974); Evans v. Everett, 279 N.C. 352,
183 S.E.2d 109 (1971).
31. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 908.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-203 and comment 5 (Cum. Supp. 1985) contain
singular language when referring to the writing required.
33. "This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies." U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1978).
34. However, the proper construction of the Act requires that its interpretation and application be limited to its reason . . . . The Act should
be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes and policies.
The text of each section should be read in light of the purpose and policy
of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and the
application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as
the case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved.
Id. comment 1.
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divisive issue is which approach best accomplishes the purposes
behind section 9-203 and Article 9.
The Code attempts to promote uniformity of decisions and
simplicity in document execution by requiring language in a document to show the parties created a security interest in their negotiated bargain. To comply with the conservative position, a security
agreement must be a single writing which contains the debtor's signature, a description of collateral, and language creating or providing for a security interest.3 5 A writing containing these minimal requirements is a security agreement regardless of whether it is
denominated as such. In contrast, the liberal approach allows different writings to satisfy the individual requirements for a security
agreement when the writings can be combined by the intent of the
parties. Uniformity of the law is enhanced by consistent application of the conservative approach, rather than the varying positions taken by liberal jurisdictions on what will satisfy the Code
requirements. Determination of the parties' intent is greatly simplified by a clear statement in the document that the debtor grants
the creditor a security interest in specified collateral.
The contract law principle that the intent of the parties controls is fundamental to the judicial position that a security agreement need not be solely confined to a single document. The liberal
approach lacks much of the uniformity that characterizes the conservative approach. Those states adhering to the liberal approach
have substantial variations to their requirements for security
agreements. The weight actually given to the parties' express intent differs among states. For instance, is an intent to create a security interest recognizable if not clearly evidenced in the documents?3 6 Granting language that actually conveys the security
interest may be required in some jurisdictions.3 7 The documents
that may permissibly be combined differ. 38 Some jurisdictions require that multiple documents refer internally to one another or
that they be executed contemporaneously. 39 All or some of the fac35. American Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963).
36. See In re Bollinger, 614 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980); Comment, Security
Agreements, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 791, 814 (1984).
37. American Card Co., 97 R.I. at 63, 196 A.2d at 152.
38. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 906.
39. See Little v. County of Orange, 31 N.C. App. 495, 229 S.E.2d 823 (1976);
In re Carmichael Enterprises, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Casco Bank
& Trust Co. v. Cloutier, 398 A.2d 1224 (Me. 1979); In re Center Auto Parts, 6
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 398 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
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tors set out above may be relevant to the question of whether a
security agreement exists for the purposes of a particular
jurisdiction.
A.

The Liberal Approach

The basic foundation for the liberal approach is that the intent of the parties should govern the transaction and creation of
the security interest, rather than strict technical compliance with
the statutory language. Initial determinations of intent are derived
from the formal language of the documents. 0 Under the liberal
view, the objective threshold does not require formal language
granting a security interest."' Inferences that a security interest
may have been intended by the parties satisfy this "objective
threshold."' 2 Following this initial assessment of the instrument's
language, the actual intent of the parties must be determined by
the factfinder. 4'3 The critical stage for a secured party in a judicial
proceeding is proving the language of the documents reveals an intent by the parties to provide for a security interest. Formal words
granting a security interest are not required at either stage of ascertaining intent."" The composite documents approach allows language in any of the documents to fulfill this minimal documentary
intent. Thus, the objective threshold is surpassed relatively easily
under the liberal approach.
The liberal view lacks a uniform position among jurisdictions
applying it to the creation of a security interest. There are three
basic divisions of "liberality" among the jurisdictions. First, some
jurisdictions allow a security interest to be established when there
is language arguably transferring the interest to the secured
party. 5 Second, language referring to a security interest already in
40. Commentators have labelled this as the "objective threshold". J. WHITE &
supra note 28, at 905.
41. See Evans v. Everett, 279 N.C. 352, 183 S.E.2d 109 (1971); Komas v.
Small Business Administration, 71 Cal. App. 3d 809, 139 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1977); In
re Amex-Protein Development Corp., 504 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1974).
42. Such intent must be ascertainable from the documents themselves because parol evidence is not admissible to prove intent at the objective threshold
stage of analysis. U.C.C. § 9-203 comment 5 (1978).
43. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 905.
44. See cases at supra note 41 and In re Bollinger, 614 F.2d 924 (3d Cir.
1980).
45. See, e.g., Evans, 279 N.C. 352, 183 S.E.2d 109; Komas, 71 Cal. App. 3d
809, 139 Cal. Rptr. 669. The conservative view follows the American Card Co.
R.

SUMMERS,
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existence may be sufficient to prove a security interest in the collateral.46 Third, the most liberal approach allows a security interest
to be formed by scrutinizing the entire transaction between the
parties, even when a formal security agreement was not contemplated by the parties. 4 7 To a great extent, the differences result
from an interpretation of whether the language in the documents
"creates or provides for a security interest."'48 Generally, the liberal
approach permits very informal language in documents related to
the transaction to constitute an agreement between the parties.
In Komas v. Small Business Administration," the court took
the position that an absence of formal language granting a security
interest does not violate section 9-105(1)(l) which requires that a
security agreement "create or provide for" a security interest. In
Komas, a loan application, promissory note, and financing statement were combined to show an intent to create a security interest. 0 The court held that language in the promissory note was sufficient to evidence creation of a security interest.5 1 Some active
language of creation is required, though not formal words of conveyance, to meet the objective threshold of documentary intent.5"
Further expansion of the liberal approach occurred in In re
Amex-Protein Development Corporation.3 Presented with a
promissory note reciting, "this note secured by a security interest
in subject personal property as per invoices, '" the court found an
intent to create a security interest.5 5 This language merely referred
to the security interest instead of language conveying such an interest. "No magic words or precise form are necessary to create or
case in requiring that the document must contain language of conveyance.
46. See, e.g., In re Amex-Protein Development Corp., 504 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir.
1974).
47. See, e.g., In re Bollinger, 614 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-105(1)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1985). The general rule was
established in American Card Co. that the document must contain words of grant
to comply with the "creates or provides for" language of § 9-105.
49. 71 Cal. App. 3d 809, 139 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1977).
50. "It is sufficient if the parties use language which leads to the conclusion
that it was the intention of the parties that a security interest be created." 71 Cal.
App. at 817, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
51. Id. at 817, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
52. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 907. See Evans, 279 N.C. at
360, 183 S.E.2d at 114.
53. 504 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1974).
54. Id. at 1057.
55. Id. at 1060.
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provide for a security interest so long as the minimum formal requirements of the Code are met."56 In re Amex-Protein occupies
an intermediate position between cases holding language of conveyance is required5 7 and cases which look beyond the language to
58
the entire transaction.
In re Bollinger" exemplifies the most liberal interpretation of
the "creates or provides for" language of section 9-105(1)(1). A
promissory note, financing statement, and written correspondence
between the parties were combined to constitute a security agreement.6 0 The court scrutinized the entire transaction to determine if
a security interest existed. By not construing the language of the
promissory note in isolation from the remainder of the transaction,
the court effectively circumvented analyzing the intent expressed
in the documents to effectuate the overall intent of the parties. In
fact, the parties expressly stated a desire to execute a formal security agreement." Bollinger represents the most expansive reading of
the "creates or provides for" language of the Code by giving it little practical effect and emphasizing the ultimate intent of the
62
parties.
Analysis of the language contained in the document purporting to establish a security interest is but one aspect of the liberal
approach to security agreements. The second prong entails an
analysis of what documents may be combined to constitute a security agreement. A combination of writings to meet the requirements of 9-203 is central to the composite documents approach. It
is uniformly held that a financing statement not complying with
section 9-203 requirements cannot constitute a security agreement
standing by itself.63 Generally, a financing statement is combined
56. Evans, 279 N.C. at 358, 183 S.E.2d at 113 (citing In re Nottingham, 6
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1197, 1199 (D. Tenn. 1969)); see also Komas, 71
Cal. App. 3d 809, 139 Cal. Rptr. 669.
57. See infra cases at note 92.
58. In re Bollinger, 614 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980); In re W.J. Clark Co., Ltd., 30
Bankr. 675 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
59. 614 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980).
60. Id. at 927.
61. Language in the promissory note read: "This Promissory Note ... is further secured by security interests in a certain security agreement to be delivered
by Bollinger to Z and J with this Promissory Note .

. . ."

Id. at 925. However, no

formal security agreement was ever executed between the parties.
62. See also In re Numeric, 485 F.2d 1328 (1st Cir. 1973); Casco Bank &
Trust Co. v. Cloutier, 398 A.2d 1224 (Me. 1979).
63. See American Card Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150; Evans, 279 N.C. 352,
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss3/6
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with other writings to form the security agreement. Courts have
allowed a financing statement to be joined with a promissory
note,6 4 loan application,6 5 corporate director's 7resolution," or other
6
documents to establish a security agreement.
The impact of the Bollinger decision on the composite documents view allows virtually all writings connected with the transaction to be utilized by the court to establish a security agreement.
However, some jurisdictions have limited the joinder of documents
to cases where the documents internally refer to each other6 8 or are
executed contemporaneously." Courts reluctant to follow the Bollinger decision have occasionally employed these devices to restrict
the documents admissible to show the intent of the parties.
B.

The North Carolina Approach

North Carolina applies the liberal composite documents approach and a broad interpretation of intent to determine what constitutes a security agreement under North Carolina General Statutes section 25-9-203. No formal language granting a security
interest is required in the document.7 0 However, there must be
some language evidencing an intent to create a security interest.7 1
183 S.E.2d 109; Mitchell v. Shepherd Mall State Bank, 458 F.2d 700 (10th Cir.
1972); General Electric Credit Corp. v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 244 Ark. 971,
429 S.W.2d 60 (1968); Clark v. Vaughn, 504 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 906. A financing statement does not contain language creating a security interest and its purpose is primarily one of notice to third parties.
64. See Evans, 279 N.C. 352, 183 S.E.2d 109; Komas, 71 Cal. App. 3d 809,
139 Cal. Rptr. 669 (promissory note combined with a financing statement).
65. Casco Bank & Trust Co. v. Cloutier, 398 A.2d 1224 (Me. 1979) (financing
statement, Small Business Administration loan application, and promissory note
were combined).
66. See In re Numeric, 485 F.2d 1328 (1st Cir. 1973) (financing statement
combined with a corporate director's resolution). See also, J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, supra note 28 at 906; Comment, supra note 36, at 810.
67. See supra note 65; Little v. County of Orange, 31 N.C. App. 495, 229
S.E.2d 823 (1976).
68. See In re Center Auto Parts, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 398 (C.D.
Cal. 1968); In re Carmichael Enterprises, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
69. Evans, 279 N.C. 352, 183 S.E.2d 109; see also Little, 31 N.C. App. 495,
229 S.E,2d 823; In re Mid-Atlantic Piping Products of Charlotte, 24 Bankr. 314
(W.D.N.C. 1982); E-B Grain Co. v. Denton, 73 N.C. App. 14, 325 S.E.2d 522
(1985).
70. Evans, 279 N.C. at 359, 183 S.E.2d at 114.
71. However, in Evans the Court was presented with a fact situation where
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
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North Carolina cases have not expressly required the documents
presented to internally refer to each other or be executed contemporaneously. 72 The intent of the parties predominantly influences
the decisions in this area. 3
The leading North Carolina case in the security agreement
area is Evans v. Everett.74 Evans, the plaintiff, loaned $75,000 to
the defendant. This loan was allegedly secured by crops to be
grown on certain land during 1969. The defendant gave a promissory note for the loan and a financing statement was filed by the
plaintiff. The note and financing statement referred to each
other. 75 The note stated that it was "secured by [the] U.C.C. financing statement of North Carolina. 7 Reference to the note was
made by the following language in the financing statement: "'same
securing note for advanced money to produce crops for the year
1969.' ",77 A security agreement complying with sections 25-9203(1)(b) and 25-9-105(1)(1) was held to have been created under
these circumstances.78
The court held no formal language of conveyance was necessary to create or provide for the security interest. The court looked
to the language of the financing statement and construed the word
"securing" as providing for a security interest.79 Intent to grant a
the documents did internally refer to each other and were executed at the same
time. In re Mid-Atlantic Piping Products of Charlotte, 24 Bankr. 314 (W.D.N.C.
1982), involved a defective security agreement which referred to the financing
statement, but the financing statement and promissory note did not have cross
references to each other. The court held that there was enough evidence to link all
the documents together. An implied factor in combining the documents was the
fact that the documents were executed as part of a single transaction. Although
the court was to apply the law of South Carolina in its determination, South Carolina had not ruled on this question. Therefore, the court cited Evans as persuasive authority to decide the issue.
72. Several North Carolina commentators have criticized the decision in Evans. See R. LORD AND C. LEwis, North CarolinaSecurity Interests, § 3-1(A)(1) at
21 (1985).
73. Evans, 279 N.C. 352, 183 S.E.2d 109.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 353, 183 S.E.2d at 110.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis in original).
78. Id. at 360, 183 S.E.2d at 114.
79. We harbor no doubt that the instant financing statement and the
note manifest defendant Everett's intent to create in plaintiff a security
interest in the described collateral and that he did, in fact, provide for
such interest when he stated that the crops described therein secure the
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security interest was found by analyzing the language of both the
financing statement and promissory note. s On the question of
what satisfied the "creates or provides" language of section 25-9105(1)(1), the court required some language in the documents
which might be construed as creating a security interest.8 1
Joinder of the financing statement and promissory note allowed the court to ascertain that the parties intended to create a
security interest in the defendant's crops. It is clear that the court
considered both documents in its decision.8 2 Yet, the court's holding implies that the financing statement alone constituted a security agreement.8 3 Further, the court faced a fact situation where the
documents were related by reference and contemporaneous execution.8 4 Evans establishes that combining documents to show intent
of the parties is permitted in North Carolina. 5
The decisions which follow Evans basically adhere to the liberal view taken by the North Carolina Supreme Court. The North
8 stated
Carolina Court of Appeals in Little v. County of Orange"
that failure to "execute an instrument denominated as a 'security
agreement' is not necessarily fatal to plaintiff's claim."87 However,
note for money advanced to produce these crops.
Id. at 359 (emphasis in original).
80. Id. at 358. This position corresponds with the later view taken by Komas.
See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the position
taken in Komas.
81. "We hold, therefore, that the financing statement in question meets the
requirements of an enforceable security agreement and serves the double purpose." Evans, 279 N.C. at 360, 183 S.E.2d at 114. The court did, however, combine the financing statement with the promissory note. Otherwise, this holding
would be an extremely liberal position not adopted by any other jurisdiction.
82. Id. at 360, 183 S.E.2d at 114.
83. Id. at 353, 183 S.E.2d at 110.
84. The court did not express an opinion on whether there are limitations to
the documents which may be presented, i.e., whether contemporaneous execution
and cross references are necessary.
85. See Little v. County of Orange, 31 N.C. App. 495, 229 S.E.2d 823 (1976)
(promissory note and financing statement combined); In re Mid-Atlantic Piping
Products of Charlotte, 24 Bankr. 314 (W.D.N.C. 1982) (defective security agreement, financing statement, and promissory note were combined); E-B Grain Co. v.
Denton, 73 N.C. App. 14, 325 S.E.2d 522 (1985) (financing statement combined
with a document entitled Future Advance Note and Security Agreement).
86. 31 N.C. App. 495, 229 S.E.2d 823 (1976).
87. Id. at 497, 229 S.E.2d at 825. However, the court did not allow the plaintiff secured status because of a failure to have a sufficient signature on the financing statement. The debtor's signature was typed on the financing statement. The
court followed the liberal Evans ruling, but allowed a minor technicality to pre-
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a recent bankruptcy case exhibits an implicit dissatisfaction with
the Evans ruling."s North Carolina follows the liberal composite
documents approach but this position has not been immune from
criticism.8 9
C. The Conservative Approach
The conservative approach requires a security agreement to be
a single integrated document which grants a security interest to
the creditor. Parties to a commercial transaction must comply with
the minimum requirements of section 9-203 for a security interest
to arise. Absent a writing containing these requirements, the security interest is not enforceable against third parties or the debtor.9 0
In contrast to the liberal approach, combining documents is not
allowed to satisfy the requirements of section 9-203.11 Although
formal language containing the word "grant" is not required, there
must be language indicating that a transfer of a security interest
was intended by the parties. 2
clude the creditor from secured status. The normal Code requirements for a sufficient signature permit almost any mark intended as a signature to suffice. The
court's action implies that application of other requirements for a valid document
may be strictly applied to limit the Evans decision. This is not consistent with the
overriding importance attributed to the parties' intent established in Evans.
88. In re Murray Brothers, Inc., 53 Bankr. 281 (E.D.N.C. 1985). A sales
agreement, promissory note, financing statement, and the parties' intent were alleged to constitute a security agreement. The court determined that the objective
threshold of intent (evidenced from the language of the documents) was not met
by the documents in this case. The court did apply the liberal view established by
Evans, but with apparent reluctance. Criticism of the Evans decision was noted in
the opinion by the court. Further, the court concluded the opinion with this statement, "Mr. Maroon's failure to obtain a written security agreement from the
debtor, as required by law, is fatal to his secured claim, and the trustee's objection to his claim must be allowed." Id. at 285. The decision, taken as a whole,
reveals an implicit dissatisfaction with the Evans case.
89. R. LORD & C. LEwis, supra note 72. These two commentators recommend
that the Evans decision be overruled at the earliest possible opportunity.
90. U.C.C. § 9-203 comment 5 (1978).
91. American Card Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150.
92. Pontchartrain State Bank v. Poulson, 684 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1982);
Transport Equipment Co. v. Guaranty State Bank, 518 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1975);
Shelton v. Erwin, 472 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir. 1973); Mitchell v. Shepherd Mall State
Bank, 458 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1972); Needle v. Lasco Industries, Inc., 10 Cal. App.
1105, 89 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1970); Trust Co. of Columbus v. Associated Grocers Coop, 152 Ga. App. 701, 263 S.E.2d 676 (1979); Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales,
Inc. v. Hurst, 383 Mich. 561, 176 N.W.2d 166 (1970) In re Don Miller, Inc., 35
Bankr. 714 (E.D. Wis. 1984); American Card Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963).
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American Card Company v. H.M.H. Company93 was the first
case to consider whether documents other than a formal security
agreement comply with section 9-203. A promissory note executed
by the debtor corporation and a filed financing statement were
presented by the creditor as a security agreement. 4 The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied the creditor secured status. 5 "The financing statement which the claimants filed clearly fails to qualify
also as a security agreement by the debtor because nowhere in the
form is there any evidence of an agreement by the debtor to grant
claimants a security interest." ' The general rule and conservative
approach emanate from American Card Company. 7
Though the current trend is one of liberal interpretation,
many jurisdictions still adhere to the conservative approach." The
conservative view rejects subjective intent in favor of an objective
analysis of the language contained in a single document.
IV.

ARGUMENTS FOR A LIBERAL VIEW

The overriding concern under the liberal view is to discern the
intent of the parties.9 9 It is a basic tenet of contract law that the
intent of the parties should govern their transaction. The liberal
approach effectuates the intent of the parties by broadly interpreting the provisions of the U.C.C. A writing signed by the debtor
describing the collateral which shows an intent to create a security
interest serves as a security agreement under the liberal position.100
Effectuating the intent of the parties prevents the harsh result of a
creditor being denied a security interest and possible recovery
when the parties obviously contemplated the secured nature of the

debt.101
The U.C.C. does not contemplate great formality and form is
93. 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963).
94. Id. at 61, 196 A.2d at 151.

95. Id., 196 A.2d at 151.
96. Id. at 63, 196 A.2d at 151.
97. See A. SQUILLANTE, supra note 4, at 140.
98. See supra note 92. See also Amoco Oil Co. v. G. Sims & Associates, 162
Ga. App. 307, 291 S.E.2d 128 (1982); In re Cambridge, 34 Bankr. 88, (W.D. Mo.
1983); In re Nottingham, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1197 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
99. See supra notes 40-69 and accompanying text.
100. In re Bollinger, 614 F.2d at 928. See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 28, at 904.
101. In re Numeric, 485 F.2d 1328; Comment, supra note 36, at 813; J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 904.
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not to be exalted over substance. '1° Section 1-102 states that the
Code is to be liberally construed to promote the policies behind
the rules. 10 3 The liberal position interprets these statements as
support for not requiring a formal security agreement document. A
security agreement may be filed as a financing statement, which
supports the notion that two separate documents are not mandated by Article 9.104 Allowing any symbol intended by the parties
to function as a signature to satisfy the requirement that a security
agreement be signed by the debtor shows that the intent of the
parties rather than form was contemplated to govern by the Code
drafters.1 0 5 The liberal view uses these arguments to support reliance on the broad definition of security agreement provided in section 9-105(1)(1).
The comments to section 9-203 reveal two primary purposes
supporting the requirement for a sufficient writing.'
A financing
statement or other document which adequately describes the col102. Under this Article the traditional distinctions among security devices, based largely on form, are not retained . . . Under the Article
distinctions based on form (except as between pledge and non-possessory
interests) are no longer controlling . . . . The scheme of the Article is to
make distinctions where distinctions are necessary, along functional
rather than formal lines.
U.C.C. § 9-101 comment 3 (1978).
103. U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1978).
104. U.C.C. § 9-402. Also, the primary reason a financing statement is filed is
to perfect a security interest. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-402(1) (Cum. Supp. 1985);
see 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 11.4 (1965); Evans, 279 N.C. at 356, 183 S.E.2d at 112.
105. Comment, supra note 36, at 814. However, the conservative view would
argue this example of liberalizing the Code requirements in one area is inadequate
to justify the conclusion, that a formal security agreement can be dispensed with
by merely extrapolating from an intent to relax one of the requirements for a
security agreement.
106. "One purpose of the formal requisites stated in subsection (1)(a) is evidentiary. The requirement of written record minimizes the possibility of future
dispute as to the terms of a security agreement and as to what property stands as
collateral for the obligation secured." U.C.C. § 9-203 comment 3 (1978).
The formal requisite of a writing stated in this section is not only a
condition to the enforceability of a security interest against third parties,
it is in the nature of a Statute of Frauds. Unless the secured party is in
possession of the collateral, his security interest, absent a writing which
satisfies paragraph (1)(a), is not enforceable even against the
debtor . . ..
U.C.C. § 9-203 comment 5.
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lateral fulfills the evidentiary function. 10 7 A document other than a
security agreement cannot meet the statute of frauds function unless the "creates or provides for" language of section 9-105(1)(1) is
satisfied.1 "8 This statute of frauds function is of less concern when
the judicial action involves only the immediate parties to the
transaction.10 9 The liberal view maintains that if creation of a security interest can be ascertained from some document in the
transaction then the statute of frauds function is fulfilled by a
wording which demonstrates that a security interest was created.
Therefore, the evidentiary and statute of frauds purposes are
achieved by the liberal composite document approach.
Advocates of the liberal position observe that prior or subsequent creditors are not harmed because they have effective notice
of the security interest by the filed financing statement." 0 "The
only party harmed by the denial of the security interest is the
party claiming the status of a secured creditor.""' Preventing a
harsh result between the immediate parties is not accomplished at
the expense of other creditors.
The reasoning which supports the liberal view rests on the equitable nature of following the intent of the parties. U.C.C. language explicitly upholds following intent, the primary purposes of
section 9-203 are fulfilled, and no harsh results accompany the liberal view. The liberal composite documents approach incorporating
relaxed requirements for creation language is the current trend in
evaluating whether a security agreement exists.
V.

ARGUMENTS

FOR THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND REBUTTAL
OF THE LIBERAL VIEW

The Uniform Commercial Code clearly contemplates two documents in its approach to the creation and perfection of a security
interest."' Creation of a security interest is accomplished by executing a security agreement which provides the creditor secured
status."' Priority determinations hinge on when the creditor files a
107. Comment 3 of § 9-203 goes on to note that possession of the collateral
fulfills the evidentiary function as to the terms of the agreement.
108. See Comment, supra note 36, at 807.
109. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 903.
110. See Comment, supra note 36, at 813.
111. Id. at 813.
112. U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-402 (1978).

113. U.C.C. § 9-203.
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financing statement perfecting his security interest."" This twostep process illustrates the different requirements and purposes for
the documents. 1 5 The security agreement is meant to create the
security interest and evidence conveyance of that interest.' A financing statement merely gives notice that a security interest is or
may be claimed in the collateral described."' Therefore, the liberal
view's reliance on financing statements as evidence that a security
interest exists or constitutes a security agreement is misplaced due
to the different purposes ascribed to each document by the
Code." 8
It also follows from the Code language that a single document
containing the minimal requirements of section 9-203 is contemplated by the drafters. Signature of the debtor on "a writing"
which describes the collateral and "creates or provides for" a security interest constitutes a valid security agreement. 1 9 The Code
requirements are minimal. Further dilution of such minimal requisites for a valid security agreement could have easily been expressed in the Code if the liberal view was intended.2 0 Since parol
evidence is not allowed to establish a secured status,' 2 ' it seems
unlikely that oral evidence necessary to connect documents would
be favored by the drafters. The conservative approach is therefore
the most consistent reading of the Code language.
The purposes for a written security agreement are evidentiary
and in the nature of a statute of frauds.1 22 A conservative approach
satisfies both purposes in a single document. The terms of the
agreement and creation of the security interest are evidenced by
one document, thus limiting the opportunity for fraud. Under the
liberal view, 2 3 where parol evidence may be necessary to establish
the parties' intent to create a security interest, a subsequent credi114. U.C.C. §§ 9-402, 9-301, 9-312, 9-313, 9-315.
115. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-402.
116. U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-105(1)(1).
117. According to section 9-402, the financing statement may be filed prior to
the existence of the security interest.
118. Generally, the liberal view combines a financing statement with one or
more other documents.
119. U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-105(1)(1).
120. This commentator realizes a similar argument is available to the liberal
view, but the language is structured in the singular.
121. U.C.C. § 9-203 comment 5.
122. U.C.C. § 9-203 comments 3 and 5.
123. The liberal view includes all three variations of that position discussed
supra notes 45-69 and accompanying text.
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tor is exposed to a situation where collusion between the original

creditor and debtor may be to their advantage. Clearly, the Statute
of Frauds purpose is best met by the conservative approach. In
terms of an evidentiary purpose, the liberal view enhances the risk
that terms in the assimilated documents will be inconsistent. 2 " Inconsistent documents joined with a subjective determination of intent increase the possibility of future disputes.1 25 Requiring more
of the terms of the agreement to be in a single document reduces
the likelihood of future disagreement. A more subjective standard
may result in increased litigation. The conservative approach best
serves the purposes for a written security agreement underlying
section 9-203.
The most persuasive argument for not following the composite
documents approach is that it contravenes the overriding purposes
and policies of the U.C.C. 126 Simplicity is achieved by consolidat-

ing the parties' agreement in a single document. 127 A determination of intent by a judicial body or by a subsequent creditor involves considerations which are by no means simple. The Code
requirements of section 9-203, when given their ordinary meaning,
are minimal and simple to comply with. It is much easier to
achieve uniformity in the law concerning security agreements when
the conservative position is strictly applied. Uniformity of the law
is certainly not achieved by the varying positions taken by individual liberal jurisdictions. Although the Code is to be "liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies, 112 a liberal approach toward security agreements contradicts

the simplicity and uniformity envisioned by the drafters.
Advocates of broad intent, through the composite documents
position, state that third parties are unharmed by the lack of a
formal security agreement. 2 9 The basis for this reasoning is that
constructive notice occurs through the filed financing statement.13
The flaw in this reasoning is that it relies on the false assumption
124. Note, In re Bollinger, 50 CIN. L. REv. 225, 236 (1981).
125. See U.C.C. § 9-203 comment 3.
126. See U.C.C. § 1-102(1), (2).
127. "Simplicity certainly is not promoted when a court must engage in a
complicated search through various documents for the intent of the parties."
Note, supra note 124, at 235.
128. U.C.C. § 1-102(1).
129. Comment, supra note 36, at 813.
130. Id. at 813. A system of notice filing was established to be supplemented
by further inquiry. See U.C.C. § 9-402 comment 2.
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that no harm results from creating uncertainty among other interested creditors or potential creditors. Subsequent creditors must
bear the added burden and risk of determining whether a valid
security interest was "intended" by the parties. Assuming the utmost cooperation from the original creditor and debtor"a ' upon inquiry by the third party, the status of the security interest may
still remain uncertain in a liberal approach jurisdiction. It is, of
course, possible for the subsequent creditor to pursue a security
interest in property not covered by the financing statement or conduct a similar transaction with other parties. 132 Under this example, a creditor may escape unharmed-but not unaffected. A formal security agreement integrated in a single document virtually
eliminates the uncertainty engendered by the liberal approach.
There are several problems attributable to reliance on a liberal
approach. Encouragement of sloppy drafting and dispensing with
formal security agreements may be byproducts of the liberal attitude.13 3 In the absence of a default clause, what circumstances trigger default under the combined documents?13 4 Conversion of property by the debtor is made easier when no formal security
agreement exists. 35 These problems arise solely because of the failure to execute a security agreement complying with requirements
easily fulfilled by a simple written instrument.
The conservative approach suffers from the disadvantage that
an occasional harsh result will accrue to the creditor who fails to
execute a formal security agreement. This result can be justified on
several grounds. One commentator emphasizes that requiring a
creditor to execute a single document denominated a security
agreement is a valid pre-condition to granting the benefits of secured status. 36 Liberal courts are in effect resolving "a failure to
comply with the minimal formal requirements of section 9-203 in
favor of the noncomplying party.' 1 37 Since the requirements of section 9-203 are reduced to a minimum, there should be strict adher131. This may be a risk-filled assumption for the subsequent creditor where
the parties inquired of have such a personal interest in the subject property.
132. This assumes that other parties would be available to conduct similar
transactions and that substitute property is available.
133. Note, supra note 124, at 236.

134. Comment, supra note 36, at 815-16.
135. Id. at 819.

136. A. SQUILLANTE, supra note 4, at 187.
137. Id. at 187.
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ence to the standards enunciated.13 8 The risk of a seemingly harsh
result is outweighed by the greater uniformity, certainty, and simplicity inherent in the conservative approach. Parties to a secured
transaction can promote Code policies and easily avoid any harsh
results by executing a simple security agreement complying with
section 9-203.
VI.

CONCLUSION

North Carolina and other jurisdictions adhering to the composite documents approach should revert to the single document
approach. A return to this approach would result in a more sound
commercial policy for North Carolina and other liberal jurisdictions. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides a rational, simple method for creating and perfecting a security interest in commercial transactions. Attorneys should not rely on the
liberal attitude prevailing in some jurisdictions, but should execute
formal security agreements for their clients as a matter of common
practice. The uniformity and simplicity obtained by a strict adherence to the language of the Code outweighs the benefits of allowing
the parties' intent to govern the commercial transaction.
Gregory D. Hutchins

138. R.

LORD

& C.

LEWIS,

supra note 72, § 3-1(A)(1) at 19.
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